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 In the Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, the foundation of a sustainable 
federalism is thought to be a scientifically precise balancing of national and subnational power. 
Experience shows, however, that national and subnational actors in highly diverse systems are 
capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence, so that the 
formal, constitutionalized balance of power rarely settles the question of the actual balance of 
power between levels of government. A more important factor in ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree of symmetry across subnational 
units in their relation to the central state.  A comparison of the U.S. and Spain suggests that 
federalism is most directly threatened when subnational units compete not collectively with the 
central state, thereby checking its power, but with each other, a condition that furnishes the 
central state with opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk genuine, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Since the middle of the last century, a consensus seems to have begun to emerge, at least 
in the West, that the modern nation state is best and most sensibly organized when its domestic 
powers are to some degree decentralized.  Whether rooted in a post-War fear of tightly 
centralized power as a route to tyranny, a post-Communist rejection of the feasibility of central 
state planning, or any of a host of welfarist theories that are frequently invoked to justify 
contemporary federalism, decentralization of official power has come to be seen as essential to 
good governance, if not indeed indispensable to the successful and sustainable practice of mass 
democracy.  Many of the world’s most successful new democracies, along with those that aspire 
to success (e.g., India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina) have been founded or refounded on 
formal principles of federalism.  Other nations that have already enjoyed success as democracies 
have sought to ensure it in the future through deliberate programs of devolution and 
decentralization (e.g., United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy).  And of course this very question has 
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dominated recent debates and negotiations concerning the ultimate structure of the European 
Union. 
 This commitment to decentralization does not, however, rest on the belief that democracy 
somehow entails decentralization as a matter of theoretical necessity.  Indeed, in some respects 
the formal structures of federalism stand in opposition to national democratic aspirations, as the 
recent American agitation over the Electoral College attests.  Rather, the spreading commitment 
to decentralization seems to flow more from a pragmatic belief that democratic self-governance 
is best sustained over the long term when state power is shared to at least some extent, and for at 
least some purposes, by national and subnational levels of government.  As a result, some of the 
most pressing questions facing modern democratic states and constitutional designers concern 
the degree to which power should be decentralized and the kinds of institutions that are best 
capable of sustaining the pragmatically ideal distribution of national and subnational power in 
any given place. 
 In modern constitutional law, these concerns typically manifest themselves in two closely 
related aspects of constitutional structure: (1) the specific constitutional allocation of 
competencies (powers) to each level of government; and (2) the general constitutional default 
rule dictating where power presumptively lies when the constitution is silent.  Especially in the 
Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, in which a scientifically precise balancing of 
opposing forces is seen as the key to institutional sustainability,1 achieving just the right 
combination of express power allocations and residual power default rules is typically thought to 
                                                 
 
1
 The Federalist, Nos. 48-51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).  The prevalence of 
scientific imagery and the aspiration to scientific validity in the constitutional thought of the founding generation is 
well-documented in Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture 
(1986).  See also, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (describing the constitutional system of separated 
powers as “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure”). 
 4 
be the indispensable foundation for a successful decentralized state.  An appropriate 
constitutional symmetry between national and subnational power, in other words, is the 
precondition for a sustainable decentralization of official power.  To give too much power to the 
national government risks an inward collapse toward centralization and its attendant dangers; to 
give excessive power to subnational units risks the fragmentation of the state and the consequent 
loss of the many benefits and protections it might otherwise provide. 
 In this paper, we wish to dispute this account.  In our view, constitutional allocations of 
power and default rules are not the most important factors determining the long-term viability of 
federal or otherwise decentralized states.  In fact, experience shows that national and 
subnational actors are capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of 
mutual influence, and that the formal, constitutionalized balance of power therefore rarely settles 
the question of the actual balance of power between levels of government.  Initial asymmetries 
of power enshrined in constitutions can thus be altered by informal arrangements and 
workarounds, moderating the dangers of instability posed by ill-advised or poorly executed 
initial constitutional endowments. 
 In contrast, we contend that a more important factor in ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree of symmetry across subnational 
units (states, provinces, cantons, Länder, etc.) in their relation to the central state.  The real 
threat to the stable, long-term exercise of decentralized forms of power arises when subnational 
units develop interests in their relation to national power that conflict with the interests of other 
such units.  To put this proposition in its most general terms, federalism and other forms of 
decentralization are most directly threatened when subnational units fail to maintain a united 
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front in dealing with national power.  In these circumstances, states and provinces compete not 
collectively with the central state, thereby checking its power, but with each other, a condition 
that furnishes the central state with opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk 
genuine, long-term destabilization.   
 Asymmetry of power, we therefore conclude, is more dangerous in its horizontal than in 
its vertical dimension.  We will demonstrate this proposition with numerous examples from two 
systems that strike very different balances: the United States and Spain.  The argument proceeds 
as follows.  Part II of this paper describes the Madisonian model of contestatory federalism, in 
which system-wide stability – and ultimately individual liberty – is secured as a matter of 
constitutional design by the exacting allocations of national and subnational power.  Part III 
demonstrates that a vertically symmetrical initial constitutional allocation of power is less 
important than the Madisonian model predicts because of the ability of official actors to develop 
significant extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence.  This allows each level of 
government to check the other’s power in ways that the long-term stability of the system may 
require, but for which no formal constitutional provision has been made.  Such avenues of 
influence, moreover, are capable of arising in widely divergent systems characterized by very 
different initial constitutional allocations of power. 
 Part IV demonstrates that a much more serious long-term threat to the sustainability of 
balanced, decentralized power can arise from horizontal asymmetry of interests across 
subnational units.  Here, much can be learned from a comparison between the generally uniform 
relations of the American states to the United States government, on the one hand, and the 
starkly divergent relations between Spanish Autonomous Communities and the Spanish central 
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government, on the other.  Moreover, we will argue, in the presence of such horizontal 
asymmetry of interest, the design of constitutional structures of national-subnational relations 
can have important and unanticipated consequences. 
 
II.  THE MADISONIAN MODEL OF CONTESTATORY FEDERALISM 
 There are many different kinds of, and justifications for, federal and other decentralized 
arrangements of governmental power.2  Here, however, we focus on “contestatory” federalism, 
a conception of divided power that justifies federalism as a method of protecting liberty through 
the institutionalization of a permanent contest for power between national and subnational units 
of government.  This is the justification most closely associated with the brand of federalism 
practiced in the United States, and most clearly articulated by James Madison in 1787.3   
 “The accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands,” wrote Madison in Federalist 
No. 47, “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”4  To protect liberty, on this 
view, power must be divided.  Federalism serves this purpose by parceling out government 
powers among different levels of government, giving each level of government, national and 
subnational, powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the abuses of the other.5  
Although power is fragmented in such a system, its use is unified because each level of 
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 See, e.g., Thomas Dye, American Federalism (1990); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism 
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government pursues the same goal: serving the interests of the people.6   As Madison put it, 
“[t]he federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, 
constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.”7   Federalism, on this 
model, is a dynamic system designed to be manipulated by the people to produce results they 
desire.  Hamilton put this point clearly: 
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the 
masters of their own fate.  Power being almost always the rival of power, the 
general government will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general 
government.  The people, by throwing themselves into the scale, will infallibly 
make it preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of 
the other as the instrument of redress.8 
 
On the American Framers’ view of federalism, then, popular allegiance to any government is not 
organically fixed, but rather will ebb and flow according to that government’s instrumental value 
to the populace at any given time.9  Contestatory federalism therefore does not define a static 
relation among national and subnational governments, but a living, dynamic one, and subnational 
governments must accordingly have sufficient autonomy and power to play their assigned roles. 
                                                 
 
6
 Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic 23 (1987). 
 
7
 The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 46 (Madison), at 294. 
 
8
 The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 28 (Hamilton), at 180-81. 
 
9
 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Martin Landau, 
Federalism, Redundancy, and System Reliability, 3 Publius 173 (1973); Dye, supra note 2, at 6; Todd E. Pettys, 
Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 329 (2003). 
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 Precisely how much power, then, must each level of government possess in order to 
create a system of perpetual, mutual conflict among levels of government?  Madison never 
purports to provide a universal answer to this question, even if he thought one existed, but he 
does suggest that to design a successful and sustainable constitutional system of federalism 
requires considerable forethought and painstaking calculation of an almost scientific quality.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed this view, describing the constitutional allocation of 
government power as “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure”10 that 
generally requires strict judicial policing to prevent deviations from the constitutional plan.11 
 Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of U.S. national power in the twentieth century, 
contestatory federalism to this day is woven into the structure of American intergovernmental 
relations.  Although it does not describe the historically dominant relationship between the state 
and national governments, which has more often been cooperative than hostile,12 
intergovernmental contestation remains nonetheless a background potentiality built into the 
system that influences the ways in which the two levels of government interact.13   
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 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); on the scientific metaphor, see generally Kammen, 
supra note 1. 
 
11
 A host of other Supreme Court decisions illustrate the Court’s belief that painstaking fidelity to the 
original plan of power allocation is required for the long-term survival of the constitutional system, and ultimately of 
liberty itself.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  Although it 
is by no means clear that constitutional allocations of power were meant originally to be enforced judicially – 
Madison certainly seemed to contemplate a more overtly political form of contestation and struggle – the Supreme 
Court early on construed its own role to be one of umpiring disputes between state and national power, and deciding 
them in accordance with constitutionalized decisions concerning power allocations.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316 (1819). 
 
12




 See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (2008) (describing 
“sanctions” designed into federal systems). 
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 Consequently, the American states have frequently understood themselves, and have been 
understood by their inhabitants, as important, autonomous, and often effective defenders of the 
interests of the local citizenry against the central state.  As Madison anticipated, U.S. states have 
a long record of inserting themselves between their citizens and Washington, and of deploying 
their powers in ways intended self-consciously to thwart the operation of national policies that 
they have determined to be destructive of their citizens’ liberties and others interests.  Examples 
include the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which loudly protested the national 
government’s suppression of political criticism; the Nullification Crisis of 1832, in which South 
Carolina threatened to use force to prevent national customs officials from collecting tariffs on 
goods unloaded in Charleston Harbor; numerous instances in which states have refused to 
cooperate with national officials in the implementation of national regulatory regimes; and the 
frequent use today by states of lawsuits to challenge national regulatory authority.14  
 
III.  VERTICAL SYMMETRY OF POWER AND EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES OF INFLUENCE 
 The constitutional decentralization of governmental power may be achieved in many 
different ways.  Powers may be expressly allocated to different levels of government.  Such 
powers may be granted exclusively to one level of government, or they may be concurrent.  If 
concurrent, they may be shared across the range of possible uses of the power, or different 
aspects of the power may be isolated and parceled out to different levels of government.  Where 
concurrent powers come into conflict, such conflicts may be resolved in favor of one level or the 
                                                 
 
14
 These and many other incidents are described in James A. Gardner, Interpreting State 
Constitutions (2005), ch. 3. 
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other.  Where the constitution is silent, default rules may provide for the allocation of residual 
power to one level or another.15   
 Such constitutional allocations of power doubtless have important ramifications for both 
the possibility of mutual checking in a federal system and its efficacy.  Nevertheless, 
constitutional rules of power allocation do not structure national-subnational relations in their 
entirety, nor do they provide the exclusive means by which national and subnational power may 
mutually check each other.  Instead, some potential seems always to exist for the development 
of informal and extraconstitutional means of mutual influence among levels of government.  
Here, we illustrate the emergence of such methods of influence in two systems with very 
different initial power allocations: the American system of formal federalism, and the Spanish 
system of decentralization by sufferance. 
 
A.  THE UNITED STATES: SUBNATIONAL POWER IN A REGIME OF 
UNPLANNED NATIONAL CENTRALIZATION 
 The contemporary allocation of power between the national and subnational governments 
in the United States has wandered far from the original constitutional plan.  Members of the 
founding generation were for the most part deeply suspicious of concentrated, centralized power, 
the model of national empire against which they revolted.16  As a result, even those who 
professed the need to create a stabilizing central authority agreed that doing so entailed serious 
risks.  The Framers solved this problem by creating a national government which they believed 
would have the power to do what needed to be done nationally, but nothing else – a national 
                                                 
 
15
 See Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (3d ed. 2008), for numerous examples. 
 
16
 Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise 
101-102 (2008). 
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government of strong but nevertheless limited powers.  This solution was implemented through 
a constitutional decentralization of power that created a national government of limited and 
enumerated powers and allocated all general and residual powers to the subnational level.17 
 During the republic’s first half-century, the actual balance of power between national and 
subnational power adhered closely to the original plan.  The states dominated most aspects of 
public affairs, the national government remained small and relatively weak, and the political 
identity of most Americans revolved around their state and local governments rather than the 
nation.18  The Civil War marked the beginning of a long period of change in this constitutional 
settlement.  Successful prosecution of the war required, for the first time, a significant 
accumulation of power at the national level and even, according to some historians, the invention 
and deliberate propagation of a national identity to legitimate the sacrifices that northerners and 
unionists were asked to endure, and to justify the eventual reuniting by force of the continental 
nation.19 
 By the late twentieth century, the conditions of modernity had intruded so far on the 
original constitutional plan that the actual distribution of power between national and subnational 
governments tipped dramatically in favor of national power.  The growth of the administrative 
state, the exigencies of fighting two world wars and the Great Depression, and the ultimately 
supportive role of the federal government in the civil rights movement conferred great legitimacy 
                                                 
 
17
 U.S. Const., amend. X: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316 (1819). 
 
18
 Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 Rutgers 
Law Journal 911 (1993). 
 
19
 E.g., Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776-1861 (1964). 
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on the national government at the expense of the states.20  During a period spanning more than 
four decades, moreover, the Supreme Court conferred constitutional legitimacy on these 
developments in a series of rulings that ratified the huge expansion of national power that had 
occurred in practice.21 
 In these circumstances, it might be assumed that subnational power in the United States 
has become largely irrelevant, yet this is far from true.  In fact, even in conditions that are 
hostile to the effective exercise of formal subnational power, the American states have 
nevertheless managed to develop a wide variety of techniques – some clearly contemplated by 
the Constitution, others less so –  for successfully protecting themselves against national power, 
asserting the interests of their citizens against invasion by the national government, and 
influencing the direction and content of national policy.   
 1. Threats of Violent Resistance.  Among the most potent – and riskiest – 
extraconstitutional strategies American states have employed is the use or threat of force to resist 
exercises of national power.22  Although the ultimate use of force – secession – failed badly, 
states have occasionally resorted to force in smaller and more calculated ways to get what they 
want.  The Nullification Crisis is probably the most prominent example.  In 1832, the national 
government enacted a protectionist tariff that many Southerners felt benefitted northern 
industrial interests at the expense of the southern economic interest in agricultural exports.  In 
response, South Carolina raised a small army, which it threatened to deploy to block any effort 
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 Feeley and Rubin, supra note 16, at 110-15. 
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 E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 
22
 The following examples are drawn from Gardner, supra note 14. 
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by national customs officials to collect the tariff in the port of Charleston.  The threat of 
violence was eventually defused when the national government took careful steps to avoid any 
outright provocation, and South Carolina ultimately backed down from its threat to use force.  
Nevertheless, shortly after resolution of the crisis, Congress in 1834 enacted the Compromise 
Tariff, which phased out over a period of nine years the provisions to which South Carolinians 
objected.23  While South Carolina was not able to obtain precisely what it wanted, as quickly as 
it wanted, its threatened use of force clearly influenced the content of national law. 
 Another, more recent example of a state’s threatened use of force is the 1957 
saber-rattling of Arkansas in response to national efforts to implement a federal judicial order 
requiring the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, the state capital.  Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus, vowing to resist federal enforcement of the desegregation order, 
deployed the National Guard at the school forcibly to prevent the student plaintiffs from entering 
the building.24  As a confrontation brewed, the governor withdrew the troops, leaving the 
students to face a white mob.  President Eisenhower then sent in a thousand troops from the 
101st Airborne Division, a regular United States military unit, to enforce the court order and keep 
the peace.25   
 Even more recently, states have threatened physical confrontation with the national 
government over issues of environmental policy.  Prompted largely by national legislation that 
restricted grazing on public lands, Nevada in 1979 enacted legislation “declaring state 
                                                 
 
23
 For a good account of these events, see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (1966). 
 
24
 See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (1989), at 222-24. 
 
25
 Id.  
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sovereignty over 49 million acres of Nevada territory” owned by the national government and 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management.26  Although this so-called “Sagebrush 
Rebellion”27 never led to organized violence against the national government by any state, a 
more serious incident occurred in 1988 when Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus deployed police at 
the state border to seize a railway shipment of radioactive waste generated at a federal nuclear 
facility in Colorado.28  Andrus had the shipment seized pursuant to a state-declared policy of 
refusing to accept additional nuclear waste from out-of-state.  As recently as 2002, the Governor 
of South Carolina made a similar threat to block at the border trucks containing weapons-grade 
plutonium destined for a federal storage site in the state.29 
 2. Weak Defiance.  In addition to these outright illegal means of resisting national 
power, states also have at their disposal a number of what might be termed “quasi-legal” 
strategies for influencing national policy.  One such strategy is a deliberate failure fully to 
comply with or to enforce binding federal law.  Here, the state does not overtly defy national 
law, but nevertheless attempts, in the guise of implementing it, to undermine it by half-hearted or 
inappropriate measures.  For example, in 1975, as part of an energy policy designed to conserve 
oil, Congress lowered the speed limit on all roads to 55 miles per hour.  While most states 
responded by complying, Montana complied in an extremely half-hearted way.  Instead of 
                                                 
 
26
 Paul Wallace Gates, Pressure Groups and Recent American Land Policies 3 (1980).  
 
27
 For an overview of this “sagebrush rebellion,” see William L. Graf, Wilderness Preservation and 
the Sagebrush Rebellions 225-32 (1990); R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush 
Rebellion and Environmental Politics 109-10 (1993). 
 
28
 Fox Butterfield, Idaho Firm on Barring Atomic Waste, New York Times, Oct. 23, 1988, 1:32. 
 
29
 David Firestone, S. Carolina Battles U.S. on Plutonium, New York Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at A21; 
Matthew Boedy, Governor Declares State of Emergency, Augusta Chronicle, June 15, 2002, at A01.  
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enforcing violations of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit as traffic infractions, it issued five-dollar 
“environmental” citations to drivers traveling above 55 m.p.h., but below what Montana police 
considered a safe speed.30  Violations were not charged against drivers’ insurance records.  This 
kind of “enforcement” worked to undermine the congressional objective since it both declared 
quite plainly the state’s continuing opposition to the national policy, and all but invited the public 
to exceed the national speed limit with impunity within the borders of the state — an invitation 
that drivers, predictably, took up with enthusiasm.31 
 3. Political Influence.  In addition to resistance and defiance, American states have 
several fully legal avenues of recourse to influence the way in which national power is exercised.  
First and foremost is the influence of national legislation through political means.32  State 
officials often have the capacity, for example, to press the state’s congressional delegation to 
work for the enactment at the national level of policies favored by the state.33  For a decade, this 
view of state influence induced the United States Supreme Court to abandon any attempt to 
enforce constitutional limits on the national commerce power, a position from which it has since 
                                                 
 
30
 According to news accounts, the “conventional wisdom” was that no serious infractions would be 
charged for daytime driving below about 85 mph in good weather conditions.  Tom Kenworthy, New Life in the 
Fast Lane: Wide-Open Throttles in Wide Open Spaces, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1995, at A3. 
 
31
 Robert E. King and Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 157-162 
(1999); Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in Montana, New York Times, July 10, 1989, at A14:3. 
 
32
 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); Jesse Choper, Judicial 
Review and the National Political Process (1980). 
 
33
 See Donald H. Hadier, When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and 
Intergovernmental Lobbying (1974); Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental 
Lobbying and the Federal System (1995); John Dinan, State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: 
Lessons from the 104th Congress, 27 Publius 129 (1997). 
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backed away.34   In an important study, Larry Kramer has suggested that political negotiation 
coordinated under the auspices of the national political parties has evolved into the single most 
important mechanism by which states influence the behavior of national officials.35  Through 
such means, state officials may head off legislation of which they disapprove before it is enacted, 
or obtain modifications of proposed national policies that eliminate or moderate provisions to 
which state officials object.  As the Supreme Court observed more than twenty years ago: 
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests 
is apparent . . . in the course of federal legislation.  On the one hand, the States 
have been able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own 
treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in aid. . . .  As a 
result, federal grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local 
government expenditures. . . .  Moreover, at the same time that the States have 
exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they have been able to exempt 
themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.  For example, the Federal Power Act, the National Labor 
Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security 
                                                 
 
34
 Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), with 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  See also United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 
35
 Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. 
L. Rev. 215 (2000). 
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Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States 
and their subdivisions.36 
As this account suggests, the states have been able successfully to exploit their political influence 
in Washington to obtain many benefits and concessions from the national government.37 
 4. Withholding of Necessary Cooperation.  Even where the national government has 
exercised its power in ways that states find objectionable, they often are not deprived entirely of 
the means to ameliorate what they perceive to be negative influences of that power on the state’s 
citizenry.  As the Framers anticipated, the successful invocation of national power sometimes 
requires the cooperation of state officials.38  In recognition of this requirement of 
intergovernmental cooperation, Congress has frequently structured national programs so as to 
delegate to state officials a crucial role in the implementation and enforcement of the programs.  
All of the largest and most costly non-military domestic national programs — social security, 
welfare, food stamps, and so on — delegate much of the responsibility for the day-to-day 
operation of the programs to the states.39  State responsibility for running these programs may 
include setting eligibility requirements, determining benefit levels, or enforcing compliance with 
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 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985). 
 
37
 For a recent, sustained, and detailed account of how states have successfully used their power in 




 The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 27 (Hamilton), at 176-77. 
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programmatic requirements, functions that require the exercise of a significant amount of official 
discretion.40 
 When the national government grants states this kind of significant responsibility for 
implementing national initiatives, it often does so by establishing parameters that define the outer 
boundaries of state discretion.41  Nevertheless, within these boundaries, state officials may often 
have room to bend their implementation of national policy in ways that also serve state interests, 
even when those interests are opposed to successful implementation of the national program.42  
 Even more straightforwardly, states may simply refuse financial incentives offered by the 
national government to secure state cooperation.43  For example, New Hampshire has refused 
repeatedly to enact a mandatory seatbelt law, thereby forgoing a portion of its allocation of 
federal highway maintenance and construction funds.44  Nevada and Wisconsin for years 
sacrificed federal highway funds by refusing to lower their statutory threshold for drunken 
driving convictions to a blood alcohol level of 0.8 percent, in defiance of federal law requiring 
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the adjustment.45  Kentucky abolished state vehicle emission standards, threatening its ability to 
meet federally mandated pollution limits, which would lead to the loss of nearly $2 billion in 
federal highway funds.46 
 5. Recourse to Law.  Another fully legal and formally recognized way in which 
American states influence policy-making by the national legislative and executive branches is by 
invoking the power of the national judicial branch against them.  States have often had success 
suing the federal government in federal court over alleged abuses of national authority.  In 1992, 
for example, New York successfully sued the United States in federal court, obtaining a ruling 
invalidating a portion of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 
1985 on the ground that one of its provisions exceeded national authority under the Commerce 
Clause.47  In subsequent years, federal courts have at the behest of states or state agencies 
invalidated numerous other federal statutes on similar grounds.48  In each of these cases, a 
federal court has held that some piece of national legislation exceeded the limits of enumerated 
national powers.   
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B.  SPAIN: SUBNATIONAL POWER IN A REGIME OF 
DECENTRALIZATION BY SUFFERANCE 
1.  Constitutional Allocation of Power in Favor of the Central State 
 The present Spanish Constitution was adopted in 1978 following the fall of the Franco 
regime.  In response to fears in many quarters that the sudden easing of decades of central 
repression might quickly lead to a disintegration of a newly refounded, democratic Spanish state, 
the Spanish Constitution was drafted to create an extremely powerful and highly centralized 
national government – far more so than the government of the United States. 
 The Spanish Constitution begins with an emphatic statement of national identity.   
“National sovereignty,” it proclaims, “belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all state 
powers emanate.”49  “The Constitution,” it goes on, “is based on the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish Nation.”50  Despite this fundamental commitment to a national model, the Spanish 
Constitution contains elaborate provisions authorizing a substantial degree of decentralization of 
power.  Indeed, in many respects the Spanish Constitution looks very much as though it 
contemplates the creation of a federal-style state, albeit by different means than are ordinarily 
employed by most federations.  The promise of these provisions, however, is undermined by a 
small number of key provisions that dramatically diminish the possibility of meaningful formal 
Spanish subnational autonomy. 
 Early on, in acknowledgment of Spain’s long history of shifting regional power and its 
deep cultural diversity, the Spanish Constitution “recognizes and guarantees the right to 
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self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed.”51  An entire chapter 
of the Constitution appears to make good on this promise by recognizing the “right to 
self-government” of Autonomous Communities (Communidades Autónomas), which it defines 
to include “bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics” 
and “provinces with a historic regional status.”52  Several sections follow this provision that, as 
in virtually every constitution drafted since the end of World War II, parcel out the various 
competencies of the national and subnational governments into those that are exclusively 
national, those that may be exercised exclusively by subnational units, and those that may in 
certain circumstances be exercised concurrently at both levels.53  On paper, the division of 
competencies is not weighted especially in favor of either national or subnational power, and to 
the casual reader probably does not look all that different from the division of competencies 
found in the constitutions of established federal states such as Germany or Austria. 
 Where the Spanish Constitution differs dramatically from standard European models of 
constitutional federalism, however, is in the mechanism it creates to devolve power to the 
Autonomies, one weighted heavily toward the central state.  This is because neither the 
existence nor the powers of any Autonomous Community is guaranteed, or even recognized, by 
the Spanish Constitution.  Rather, the Constitution delegates all decisions to recognize and 
empower Autonomous Communities entirely to the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) as 
matters of purely legislative discretion.  Thus, Section 144 provides: “The Cortes Generales 
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may, . . . by an organic act . . . [a]uthorize the setting up of a Self-governing Community.”54  
Although the provinces seeking recognition as an Autonomous Community in the first instance 
draft a Statute of Autonomy (Estatuto de Autonomía) for parliamentary consideration,55 
Parliament is free to alter the proposed statute.56  Moreover, even though the Constitution 
expressly provides that an approved Statute of Autonomy “shall be the basic institutional rule of 
each Self-governing Community”57 – that is, shall function as a subnational constitution – it also 
provides that any and all amendments to the Statutes must be approved by the Spanish 
Parliament.58 
 In giving the central government virtually unlimited power to approve both the creation 
of Autonomous Communities and their assumption of constitutionally authorized powers of 
self-governance, the Spanish Constitution departs significantly from the most common model of 
constitutional federalism.  In federal states, the authority of subnational units to govern 
themselves, and the powers they may exercise, are typically provided by the constitution, not by 
the national legislature.  Even where the legislature retains authority to recognize new 
self-governing subnational units, as in the United States,59 or to rearrange the boundaries of 
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existing ones, as in Germany,60 subnational units once recognized retain their autonomy and 
powers independently of the wishes or actions of the central government.  The Spanish model, 
in contrast, more closely approximates what Americans will recognize as the Dillon’s Rule 
model of local home rule.  Under this model, localities owe their existence, along with each and 
every power they are permitted to exercise, to the discretion of the central legislature – a model 
long understood in the U.S. to make local power almost entirely dependent on central 
beneficence.61 
 The constitutional decision to make the possibility and scope of subnational 
self-governance dependent on the central state is weighted even further in favor of the state by 
the fact that the Spanish Constitution provides Autonomous Communities no formal role in the 
official decision making processes of the Spanish government.  In many decentralized states, the 
national government is structured to include some venue in which subnational units may 
officially voice their interests as autonomous representatives of constituent units of the nation.62  
In the United States, for example, the Senate provides states with such a forum.   
 In Spain, by contrast, Autonomous Communities are largely excluded from the national 
councils of governance.  Although the Spanish Parliament is bicameral, and includes a chamber 
denominated a “Senate,”63 the Spanish Senate differs from those found in bicameral federal 
states.  The Spanish Constitution defines the Senate as “the House of territorial 
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representation.”64  The territories represented, however, are not autonomously self-governing 
subnational units – they are not, in other words, the Autonomous Communities.  They are 
instead “provinces,” which are by definition subunits of territories that may seek recognition as 
Autonomous Communities.65  In the United States, this arrangement would correspond to one in 
which the U.S. Constitution guaranteed senatorial representation to counties rather than states.  
The Spanish Constitution does go on to authorize each Autonomous Community to designate 
one senator, plus an additional senator for each million inhabitants it contains.66  However, the 
structure of these constitutional rules ensures that senators who directly represent the 
Autonomous Communities as Communities are far outnumbered by those representing individual 
provinces.  As a result, not only must Autonomous Communities seek approval from the 
Spanish Parliament every time they wish to create or amend their Statutes of Autonomy, but they 
also have no official voice in formal decision making processes by which Parliament deals with 
such requests. 
 
2.  Development of Extraconstitutional Avenues of Influence 
 It seems clear from the foregoing analysis that formal national power in Spain far 
outstrips subnational power, and that the degree to which national power predominates over 
subnational power in Spain far exceeds the degree to which it does so in the United States.  
Nevertheless, even in an environment that seems extremely hostile to the exercise of subnational 
influence over policy-making at the national level, the Spanish Autonomous Communities have 
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begun to develop methods of doing just that.  These efforts have been slow.  Progress has been 
unsystematic.  Some of the mechanisms for asserting subnational influence are rudimentary and 
undeveloped.  But Spain’s new constitutional regime is young, and we think it is fair to say that 
the groundwork is already being laid to create a system of national-subnational relations that is 
much more complex, more nuanced, and more balanced than the lopsided allocation of power 
described above.  Under its present constitutional regime, Spain may never be a genuine federal 
state.  But it does not follow that Spain cannot be a meaningfully decentralized state in which 
subnational units enjoy a measure of real autonomy within their own borders and real influence 
in Madrid. 
 In this section, we briefly describe a few leading examples of emerging mechanisms that 
Spanish subnational units have been developing to augment the limited autonomy and influence 
that the formal provisions of the Spanish Constitution accord them. 
 1. Supplication.  Under the Spanish Constitution, the most direct method by which 
Autonomous Communities can gain a greater measure of autonomy and self-governance is 
simply and straightforwardly by asking for it.  In principle, the Spanish Constitution holds out to 
the Autonomies the possibility of assuming a fair amount of power.  Granting such requests lies 
within the complete discretion of Parliament, and it therefore need not grant Autonomous 
Communities all or even any of the autonomous power they seek.  On the other hand, it may do 
so if it wishes.  The trick therefore lies in obtaining the necessary parliamentary approval.   
 In many cases – indeed, in most – Parliament has seen fit to exercise its discretion 
beneficently.  For example, Statutes of Autonomy proposed by the Autonomous Communities 
of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Aragon, Castilla León, Galicia, and Andalusia passed easily 
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and without controversy.67  On the other hand, although the central state may devolve power 
through an exercise of beneficence, such power is held insecurely; what has been unilaterally 
granted may be unilaterally revoked. 
 2. Political Influence.  A highly significant avenue that Spanish subnational units 
have employed to protect their interests and to influence national policy making is political 
influence exercised through the medium of political parties.  Spain is a multiparty democracy68 
in which about a dozen parties are regularly able to elect at least one member of the 
parliamentary lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies.  Two large and powerful parties of 
nationwide scope and appeal tend to predominate: the Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE), the main party of the left; and the People’s Party (Partido 
Popular, or PP), the main party of the right.  Despite their size, however, neither party typically 
is able to command an outright majority in the Chamber, meaning that the major parties 
frequently must form coalitions with minor parties to govern or to enact and defeat specific 
pieces of legislation.  Many of the largest potential coalition partners are parties of primarily 
regional appeal.  These include the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, or ERC); Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió), a coalition of two Catalan 
parties; the Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, or EAJ); the Canarian Coalition 
                                                 
 
67
 The parliamentary votes were as follows: Aragon, 283-0, 10 abstentions.  Diario de Sesiones del 
Congreso de los Diputados, num. 205, Oct. 3, 2006.  Castilla Leon, 294-0, 6 abstentions.  Id., num. 247, April 17, 
2007.  Balearic Islands, 313-0, 6 abstentions.  Id., num. 197, September 12, 2006.  Valenciana, 326, 294-32.  Id., 
num. 148, February 9, 2006.  Andalucia, 308-0, 2 abstentions.  Id., num. 210, November 2, 2006.  Compare the 




 Election to the lower house of Parliament is by a semi-proportional method in which each 
province elects a number of representatives prescribed by law, but elections within each province are proportional.  
Spanish Constitution, Art. 68. 
 27 
(Coalición Canaria, or CC); and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, or 
BNG) – all parties based primarily in specific self-governing subnational communities.69 
 This arrangement creates two potentially important opportunities for subnational 
influence over national policy.  First, of course, where a national governing coalition includes a 
party with a strong base in an Autonomous Community, the interests of that Autonomous 
Community must be taken into account if the dominant member of the coalition is to bring along 
its partners.  Second, where parliamentary representation is closely divided, the dominant parties 
must bring along their own members, including those members elected from Autonomous 
Communities that might have particular interests they wish to advance within the major parties 
themselves.  In both cases, it may be possible for representatives elected from the Autonomies 
to strike deals favorable to the interests of subnational power in general, or their individual 
constituencies in particular.   
 A stark example of this phenomenon is the drastically different treatment accorded by 
Parliament to requests by Catalonia and the Basque Country for approval of amendments to their 
respective Statutes of Autonomy.  In 2005, both Autonomies formally requested that Parliament 
approve significant amendments to their Statutes of Autonomy.  For reasons that will be 
described in more detail below, both proposals were perceived by the central state as 
controversial and threatening to national unity.  In the end, however, Parliament approved the 
Catalan amendments but not the Basque amendments, which it continues to resist.70  The 
decisive difference was that the same political party, PSOE, governed in both Catalonia and in 
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Madrid, and the central government needed the support of the Catalan minor parties (CIU or 
ERC) in the Chamber of Deputies to accomplish the national political agenda.   In the Basque 
case, in contrast, the central government (PSOE) did not need support in the Chamber of 
Deputies of the Basque political parties (PNV/EA).  As a result, Catalonia obtained a new 
Statute of Autonomy, but the Basque Country has not. 
 3. Popular Political Mobilization.  Another method for achieving political influence 
that is much more widely used in Spain than in the United States is mass popular political 
mobilization – i.e., public demonstrations.  Massive demonstrations and boycotts have been 
used on many occasions to generate pressure to affect the political agendas of the central state or 
the Autonomous Communities.  These events are frequently orchestrated by political parties as a 
means of obtaining what they cannot achieve through the exercise of formal political power, but 
may also be organized by private groups with political or religious agendas.   
 An example of how popular political mobilization can be utilized by subnational units to 
influence national policy is the case of the “Papers of Salamanca,” a conflict that pitted the 
Spanish State against the Generalitat of Catalonia.  The dispute related to the ownership of 
certain documents, files, pictures, and personal letters held in the General Archive of the Spanish 
Civil War housed in Salamanca.  The main collection of the Archive was assembled at the 
conclusion of the Civil War by the Delegación del Estado para la recuperación de documentos, 
located in Salamanca, in the Autonomous Community of Castilla y León.  This government 
agency gathered up documents, pictures, and effects that the Franco troops had obtained from the 
different fronts of the Civil War and deposited them in Salamanca.71   
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 Since the end of the War, families and other individuals in Catalonia and Valencia, as 
well as the Catalan government itself, have asked for the return of these materials to their 
original owners.  After numerous claims and failed negotiations, the Spanish Government in 
1995 agreed to the return to Catalonia of papers claimed to be of Catalan origin and ownership.  
Less than two weeks after execution of this agreement, a massive public demonstration in 
Salamanca protested movement of the papers to Catalonia.  In sympathy with these 
demonstrations, the Mayor of Salamanca went so far as to order the municipal police to guard 
the entry to the Archive.  In the face of this public pressure, the Spanish Government backed 
down, and decided instead to convene a commission of experts to study the question of 
ownership.  Proceedings dragged on until 2002 when, in consideration of the recommendations 
of a badly divided commission, the Spanish Government decided that all documentation prior to 
1936 should remain in Salamanca.  Actual return of the later documents has since been tied up 
in court.72 
 Interestingly, the use of popular mobilization is not confined to efforts by the periphery to 
influence the center; sometimes interests that support political positions that are held by a 
national majority, and which are well represented in Parliament, will organize demonstrations 
against minoritarian policies or assertions of power by individual Autonomous Communities.  
For example, when the Catalan Parliament (Generalitat) approved the amendment to the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy mentioned above, several Spanish associations and media organizations 
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invoked the tactics of popular mobilization to urge a boycott of Catalan products for the express 
purpose of inducing a change in Catalan policy.73 
 4. External Influences.  One avenue by which Spanish subnational units may 
influence the central state that is entirely unavailable to subnational units in the United States is 
by appealing to institutions outside the state that are able to exercise influence within it.  By far 
the most significant of these external institutions are the European Union and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR).  For example, the Basque Country has sued the Spanish State in the 
ECHR on two occasions in an attempt to reverse disliked policies of the Spanish government.  
In one case, Basque individuals and a Basque political party sued Spain over a law that banned a 
Basque political party, and in another case the Basque Government sued the Spanish State to 
invalidate a decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court holding that the Basque government 
lacks authority to put a referendum to Basque voters.74  
 In addition to the ECHR, Autonomous Communities have occasionally appealed to the 
European Parliament.  For example, in 2007, in response to petitions received from numerous 
individuals, private groups, and the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Andalusia, the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions undertook an investigation of coastal and urban 
development policies in the País Valencià.  After a visit to the region and a wide-ranging 
investigation, the Committee issued a report harshly critical of development policies applied in 
the region:  
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The Petitions Committee remains concerned and deeply troubled as a result of the 
persistent and long-standing denial of the legitimate rights of many European 
citizens in Spain, most notably in the Valencian Region, to their land and their 
homes.  They have become the collateral victims of many rampant urbanisation 
programmes founded upon legislation which provides privilege and wealth for the 
urbaniser and which denies individuals their very integrity. 
In a large number of documented cases town councils have concocted urban 
development plans less because of their real requirements related to population 
growth and tourism, more because of what often appears as their greed and 
avarice. . . .  In no other EU country are citizens’ rights to their property abused 
in this way or to this extent, and no petitions from any other EU country on such 
matters have been received.75 
The Committee concluded by calling for further action by the European Commission and by 
Spanish regional authorities. 
 Another kind of supranational institution to which Spanish subnational units have from 
time to time appealed when thwarted by the central state are private international federations.  
Such appeals have been especially successful in the area of international sports competition.  As 
a matter of law, Spain does not permit Basque and Catalan teams to compete in international 
competitions, a decision that reverses a long tradition of such teams appearing as representatives 
of their historical communities.  The Basque and Catalan Autonomous Communities protested 
enactment of the law, and later challenged it in the Constitutional Court, which upheld the ban in 
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a 1998 decision.76  Since then, Catalan sports federations have taken their case directly to 
international sporting organizations and federations, where they have enjoyed considerable 
success, achieving recognition – and the right to compete as Catalan teams alongside Spanish 
teams – in bowling, rowing, racquetball, korfball, pitch and putt, twirling, Australian football, 
and futsal.77  
 5. Violence and Defiance.  Finally, although resort to violence, or defiance backed 
by the threat of violence, is used sparingly in the United States, it is essentially unheard of in 
Spain as a tool of official policy.  The European experience of war in general, and the Spanish 
experience of civil war in particular, is simply too fresh and too frightening to permit 
government officials recourse to this avenue of influence.  Threats of violence by subnational 
officials would be ill received not only by the central government, but by subnational 
populations as well.78   
 
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
 It is of course hazardous to draw conclusions from parsimonious data, and here we have 
examined a comparatively small number of examples in only two countries.  Still, with this 
caution in mind, we think what we have shown is sufficient to permit us to suggest some very 
tentative conclusions that warrant further study in other settings.   
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 This is not to say that violence – even overtly separatist violence – has not played a role in Spanish 
political life.  Nevertheless, such violence and the threat of it have been employed by private, unofficial groups 
from which governing authorities have been at great pains to distance themselves. 
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 First, subnational actors in federal systems seem capable of developing an extensive and 
in many cases creative array of extraconstitutional methods to influence national power.  
Federalism in the United States was designed to be strongly decentralized, but over time evolved 
into a much more strongly national system.  Yet despite the pragmatic and, increasingly, formal 
constitutional dominance of American national power, the states have nonetheless developed, 
and continue to maintain, a broad pallette of methods by which to advance their interests in the 
processes of national decision making.  Spain’s initial constitutional allocation of power tilted 
even more decisively toward the central state.  Yet despite the presence of an explicit, highly 
forcing constitutional structure, Spain’s formal centralization has not in practice inhibited the 
development of a relatively robust system of subnational decentralization based on meaningfully 
mutual checking of power.   
 Initial asymmetries of power constructed by constitutional design (or, in the American 
case, by constitutional evolution), we therefore tentatively conclude from these examples, can 
thus be altered by informal arrangements and workarounds, moderating any dangers of 
instability posed by ill-advised or poorly executed baseline constitutional endowments.  It 
follows that a vertically symmetrical initial constitutional allocation of power may be less 
important than the Madisonian model predicts because of the ability of official actors to develop 
significant extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence.  
 Second, in both the United States and Spain – two very different political environments 
constituted by very different regimes of power sharing – ostensibly weak subnational units have 
managed to develop extraconstitutional methods for protecting their interests and influencing 
national policy that are reasonably effective at least some of the time.  This does not mean that 
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national power does not and will not continue to predominate in both nations.  It does mean, 
however, that the dominance of national power is not nearly as complete as it may seem from a 
reading of the constitutions themselves or their interpretations by national courts.  We suspect 
that close investigation in other nations of how subnational power is exercised on the ground will 
reveal a host of examples similar to those described here. 
 Despite their different constitutional structures and substantially different allocations of 
national and subnational power, then, the conditions for sustainable decentralization seem to 
have evolved in both the United States and Spain.  Nevertheless, although sustainable 
decentralization seems well entrenched in the United States, in Spain it is threatened.  As we 
have shown, however, this threat does not arise from the obvious source: a constitutional 
allocation of power that tilts heavily in favor of centralization.  It arises instead from the 
asymmetrical relations that Spanish subnational units enjoy with the central state.  We turn now 
to this more serious problem. 
 
IV.  ASYMMETRY IN SUBNATIONAL RELATIONS TO NATIONAL POWER 
A.  The Assumption of Horizontal Symmetry in Contestatory Federalism 
 A frequently overlooked yet highly important assumption of the Madisonian conception 
of contestatory federalism is that the American states would fundamentally share a deep, 
common interest in the restraint of national power.  The American Framers did not, of course, 
contemplate that the states themselves would exhibit any particular uniformity; they understood 
from their own experience that the states would likely diverge in size, population, resources, 
history, customs, legal traditions, and preferences regarding the details of self-governance.  
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Indeed, the Framers expressly relied on an anticipated diversity of interests within the states in 
justifying the large geographic extent of the proposed new nation.79   
 Nevertheless, the Framers did believe strongly, even axiomatically, that all American 
states, whatever their other characteristics, would possess essentially uniform interests with 
respect to the national government.  First, the Framers evidently thought it perfectly clear that 
all the states should, and would, exhibit a healthy fear of the national government.  Although 
members of the founding generation differed on the question of how much power ought ideally 
to be allocated to the central government, they shared the belief that at some point the degree to 
which power is centralized can become excessive, raising the danger of central tyranny.80  This 
view, they clearly believed, would be shared by the states and would form a reliable and 
universal foundation for state policy decisions respecting the national government. 
 Second, the Framers assumed that the states, because they feared excessively centralized 
power, would share a common interest in ensuring that the national government be prevented 
from accumulating a dangerous measure of power.81  Finally, the Framers assumed that the 
states would act cooperatively rather than competitively should efforts become necessary to hold 
the power of the national government within constitutional limits.  If threatened, in other words, 
the states would join forces to make common cause against the national government:  
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State 
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against 
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invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.  Projects of usurpation 
cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select 
bodies of men, as of the people at large.  The legislatures will have better means 
of information.  They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all 
the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt 
a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the 
community.  They can readily communicate with each other in the different 
States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common 
liberty. . . .  If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance in one State, 
the distant States would be able to make head with fresh forces.  The advantages 
obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and 
the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its 
efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.82 
On this view, the states will respond to the threat of central tyranny not by competing with one 
another for the favor or mercy of a dangerous national government, but by rising in unison 
against a threat to any of them.  This was, indeed, the model of resistance to central authority 
that the Framers knew from the Revolution.  The various colonies may have had different tastes 
for engaging in open resistance to Great Britain, but once the course of events became clear, each 
colony stood shoulder to shoulder alongside the others. 
 This kind of symmetry of interests and motivations is, it turns out, a critical assumption 
underwriting the Madisonian model of contestatory federalism.  If, in times of crisis, 
subnational governments do not stand together against national power, their ability successfully 
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to resist it will be badly compromised.  If some subnational units attempt to pursue their own 
interests unilaterally, either by seeking favor with the national government by betraying one 
another, or by adopting positions of neutrality in national-subnational conflicts, or by 
affirmatively allying themselves with the national power against other subnational units, the 
ability of the national government to control the course of events will be greatly strengthened.  
Over the long run, such behavior risks undermining severely the ability of subnational 
governments to resist future encroachments on their interests by the national government, either 
individually or collectively.   
 In the United States, the Madisonian assumption of symmetry in subnational relations to 
the national government has held up well.  American states do not typically compete with one 
another for the favor of the national government, and the states seem consistently to have 
perceived their own interests against Washington as common interests shared generally by all the 
states.83  To be sure, representatives of the states in Congress may compete among one another 
for scarce federal benefits – the siting of military bases or government offices, for example, or 
allocations of public works funding.  Members of Congress from different states also frequently 
compete with one another on questions of policy that have ramifications for the welfare of 
individual states or regions – whether, for example, federal policy should support rural or urban 
areas, or agricultural or industrial interests, and so on.  But these competitions are never 
understood as competitions among states for the favor of the national government; they are 
instead understood as competitions among national constituency groups and interests.  A state 
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seeking national investment is not offering its friendship and support as a sovereign to the central 
state, but is merely engaged in a collective politics of distribution, a kind of politics that in fact 
contributes to the perception that all states stand on a footing of equality before national power.  
As a result, in the United States, when subnational governments do act to check national power, 
they nearly always do so in a way that is uniform and collective.84 
 Finally, on those rare occasions when American states do engage in rivalries in their 
capacity as autonomous sovereigns, those disputes are typically resolved as a matter of law in the 
courts – not as a matter of politics in Congress.  Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between states acting in their sovereign 
capacity.  The Court has exercised this authority to resolve disputes between states over the 
location of borders, jurisdiction over taxable resources, and rights in natural resources85 – the 
very kinds of disputes that in other times and places might be resolved through highly politicized 
negotiation brokered by the central state.  Moreover, the U.S. Constitution affords states few 
opportunities for appealing to Congress to intervene in such disputes, thereby reducing the risk 
that one state will appear to enjoy greater favor with the central government than another.86 
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B.  Spain: The Problem of Horizontal Asymmetry in Relations with the Central State 
1.  Subnational Disputes over the Scope of Subnational Autonomy 
 In sharp contrast to the American case, in Spain the tools of extraconstitutional influence 
have been developed and from time to time used asymmetrically by the various Autonomous 
Communities.  Whereas some Autonomous Communities seem to feel a strong need continually 
to develop and exploit extraconstitutional methods for influencing exercises of national power, 
others do not.  One reason for this diversity seems to be that not all Autonomies fear the Spanish 
central state in the manner anticipated by the model of contestatory federalism.  On the contrary, 
the Autonomies seem to diverge substantially in the degree to which they feel some sense of 
solidarity with, or indeed ownership of, the Spanish state.  
 Moreover, contrary to the assumptions of the Madisonian model of contestatory 
federalism, some Spanish Autonomous Communities seem to fear other Autonomous 
Communities more than they fear the central state itself.   Consequently, Autonomies such as 
Andalusia and Castilla La Mancha, which enjoy close and comfortable relationships with Spain, 
have far less cordial relationships with Autonomies such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
Galicia, which they seem to believe pose a greater long-term threat to their welfare than the 
national government.  Spanish subnational units thus disagree regularly about perhaps the single 
most important characteristic of any system of decentralized power: whether and to what extent 
autonomy and power should be devolved from the central state in the first instance. 
 As a result, the Autonomous Communities sometimes make very different choices about 
how to use whatever kinds of influence with the national government they may possess.  Some 
Autonomies use their influence mainly to advance policies that they support for the direct benefit 
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of their own populations.  Others, however, sometimes use their influence not so much to 
advance directly their own interests, but to induce the national government to control other 
Autonomies that they perceive as threatening, or to improve their position vis à vis other 
Autonomies with which they understand themselves to be in competition.  Thus, in 
contradiction of a basic condition of the Madisonian model, Spanish subnational units will from 
time to time exercise their autonomous power and influence in ways that are not calculated to 
advance the interests of all autonomies collectively against the central state.  This in turn creates 
conditions conducive to a potentially debilitating failure of successful decentralization: the 
central state playing favorites among competing subnational units.  Some examples will help to 
illustrate this phenomenon. 
 1. Competition among Autonomies: Café para todos.  In one of its healthier 
manifestations, rivalry among regions led to a somewhat comical competition to be recognized 
first as Autonomous Communities (in 1978), and then as “historical nationalities” under the 
Spanish Constitution.  Under the process contemplated by the 1978 Constitution, three regions 
of Spain with claims to distinctive national identities based on history, language, and culture – 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia – were granted a substantial degree of autonomy 
under a fast-track procedure.87  Even before the Spanish Constitution was approved, however, 
other regions with perhaps less well-grounded claims to recognition as distinctive nationalities 
began to assert a right to similar treatment.  These others, when presenting Statutes of 
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Autonomy for approval to Parliament, included provisions claiming nationality status.88  This 
development was eventually dubbed “café para todos” (coffee for everybody) by its critics. 
 We deem this a relatively healthy manifestation of competition among Autonomous 
Communities because, although it grew from a distrust or suspicion among subnational units, it 
manifested itself in positive claims by those units for more and parallel autonomy from the 
central state.  Thus, subnational units presented a relatively united front in their dealings with 
the central state.  This has not, however, always been the case. 
 2. Selective Subnational Opposition to Assumption of Competencies.  One arena in 
which a more destructive kind of competition among Autonomous Communities has arisen 
concerns the content of the various Statutes of Autonomy.  The Statutes of Autonomy, it will be 
recalled, serve as subnational constitutions for the Autonomous Communities, and one of the 
most important functions of these documents is to serve as the vehicle by which Autonomies 
formally adopt competencies that the Spanish Constitution authorizes them to assume.  In the 
first round of approval of the various Statutes of Autonomy, the Autonomous Communities 
generally did not adopt all of the powers available to them, and in subsequent rounds of proposed 
amendments, many of the Autonomies have therefore sought to adopt additional competencies 
from the constitutionally authorized list. 
 From time to time, some Autonomies have reacted very differently to proposals by 
various Autonomous Communities to amend their Statutes of Autonomy in similar or identical 
ways.  In some of the more extreme cases, Autonomies have taken legal action to oppose 
amendments in one Autonomy that they have not opposed when proposed by others.   
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 For example, after an arduous political process, Catalonia in 2006 successfully obtained 
parliamentary approval of extensive amendments to its Statute of Autonomy.89  The 
amendments included provisions dealing with nationality and subnational identity, historical 
rights, criminal law enforcement, assumption of competencies, relations with the European 
Union, and access to the European Court of Justice, among many others. 
 Shortly after Parliament approved the amendments, the Autonomous Communities of 
Valencia, Murcia, la Rioja, the Balearic Islands, and Aragon, along with the Partido Popular, the 
political party governing in most of these Autonomies, filed suit in the Spanish Constitutional 
Court challenging the constitutionality of thirty different provisions of the Catalan 
amendments.90  At the same time, however, many of the same provisions of the Catalan Statute 
that were challenged in the lawsuit also exist in the Statutes of Autonomy of Aragon, Andalusia, 
and Valencia without provoking either comment or opposition.91  
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 In a separate action in the Constitutional Court, Valencia sued to invalidate an 
amendment to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy assuming competence for the planning, 
construction and exploitation of hydraulic projects.92  Under this provision, Catalonia assumed 
responsibility for “waters that belong to intra-community hydrographic basins.”93  In contrast, 
when Aragon in 2007 adopted an identical provision assuming competence over internal 
waters,94 Valencia took no action, and indeed has never protested. 
 In a decentralized system of government, in which by hypothesis national power must be 
counterbalanced by adequate subnational power – and must be accompanied by a degree of 
autonomy adequate to use it independently on behalf of the interests of the subnational 
population – these kinds of action bear obvious risks.  Normally, one would expect all 
subnational units to have virtually identical interests in the range and breadth of the 
competencies that may constitutionally be exercised by any subnational unit.  Such decisions 
address the theoretical limits of permissible subnational power, and presumably all subnational 
units have an equivalent interest in seeing that the scope of their potential powers is interpreted 
as broadly as possible.  
 This is not to say that a subnational unit should in every set of circumstances wish to 
wield power to which it may potentially resort.  Not all problems are best addressed at the 
subnational level, and there is no theoretical objection in any system of decentralized power to 
the cooperative exercise of authority at the national and subnational levels.  Thus, in some or 
even many circumstances subnational units might be well advised to refrain from exercising 
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power that they possess.  But it is quite another thing for a subnational unit to take the position 
that the assumption of a power by another subnational unit is not one that constitutionally may be 
exercised by any subnational unit, or by particular subnational units out of many.95  The pursuit 
of such a strategy by Valencia, Murcia, la Rioja, the Balearic Islands, and Aragon does not 
weaken Catalonia alone; it bears the potential to weaken all the Autonomous Communities 
collectively in their relation to the central Spanish state.  The risk inherent in this strategy is all 
the more striking because of the drastic tilt of the constitutional balance of power in favor of the 
central Spanish state, and the fact that the central state has been a proven source of danger in the 
very recent past.  The only possible explanation for such behavior is that these Autonomies 
distrust some Autonomous Communities not only more than they distrust Spain, but more than 
they distrust other Autonomies.  This is a degree of distrust that seems potentially detrimental to 
the long-term success and stability of Spanish decentralization. 
 
2.  Lack of Institutions of Collective Subnational Influence 
 Clearly, many factors contribute to the rivalry among Spanish subnational units, and 
among these are real and legitimate differences among the Autonomous Communities 
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themselves, including divergent historical, cultural, and linguistic considerations.  However, 
unlike many other federal states, Spain lacks institutional arrangements that might help 
ameliorate inter-Autonomy rivalries and channel assertions of subnational autonomy and power 
in more productive ways.   
 Perhaps surprisingly, there seems to be no tradition in Spain of generally shared 
subjective feelings of collective opposition to central power and tyranny.  Throughout the long 
course of Spanish history, there has never been a “Spain” in which all regions were treated 
equally by the central state, or in which they equally feared it.  From 1492 until 1712, Spain was 
constituted of different political entities enjoying varying degrees of mutual independence.  
After the War of Spanish Succession, which concluded in 1714, the Crown of Catalonia and 
Aragon lost its political and economic independence in favor of Castilla.  The Basque Country, 
in contrast, because it supported the winning side, continued for a time to enjoy substantial 
autonomy.96  Thus, the origins of present-day Spain are based to some degree on the military 
superiority of one nation over another and the shifting fortunes of allies of one contestant or 
another in nationwide and European power struggles.  Even in recent history, moreover, 
different regions experienced the rule of the Spanish Republic of 1936 and the dictatorship of 
Franco differently, with some winners and losers, again working against the development of a 
unified attitude among the regions toward the central state. 
 Against this background, and perhaps in part because of it, present-day Spanish political 
intercourse has failed to produce institutional frameworks in which Autonomous Communities 
might work together, cooperatively, either against or in concert with national power.  We have 
already mentioned the absence of a legislative chamber (senate) that represents the interests of 
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Autonomies as Autonomies.  But Spain lacks more than formal venues for the development of a 
collective subnational politics; it lacks even informal arrangements that might support such a 
politics.   
 In the United States, such institutions not only exist, but operate with great effectiveness.  
Informal organizations such as the National Governors’ Association and the National Conference 
of State Legislatures serve as informational clearing houses for all states, develop common 
policy positions and common legislative responses to national initiatives, and coordinate 
collective lobbying efforts on behalf of collective subnational interests.  In Spain, no such 
organizations exist.97  Leaders of the Autonomous Communities deal with one another 
independently, through the intermediation of nationwide political parties, or not at all.  There is, 
in short, no institutional arrangement in which Autonomous Communities cooperate as 
Communities with a set of shared institutional interests. 
 
3.  Impact of Requirement of Central Approval of Subnational Autonomy 
 Finally, the Spanish constitutional rules structuring the process by which self-governing 
subnational units acquire autonomy very likely contribute to the problems of 
national-subnational relations in Spain.  Under the Spanish Constitution, Autonomous 
Communities must gain central approval for each element of subnational autonomy they seek to 
adopt, and the process by which the Constitution requires that they obtain this permission is a 
petition to the central parliament, followed by a formal process of negotiation, after which the 
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central authority may grant the petition or not in its complete discretion.98  This arrangement 
thus demands that the Autonomies approach the Spanish state in the capacity of one sovereign 
addressing another, and even worse, in the capacity of a weak sovereign seeking the grace of a 
stronger one – a transaction not unlike ones that were commonplace during an earlier period of 
Spanish history: a vassal coming on bended knee to the royal court to seek privileges from a 
monarch. 
 This kind of institutional structure, it seems to us, has two effects that might impede the 
emergence of a stable and sustainable decentralized state.  First, forcing subnational units 
continually to seek the blessing of the central state as a condition of undertaking autonomous 
self-government simply encourages the continual politicization of national-subnational relations.  
In the United States and in most other federal states, by contrast, questions of subnational 
autonomy are answered not by the politically bestowed grace of the central state, but by law, 
inscribed permanently in the national constitution.  In such systems, subnational units decide 
what powers to exercise based on their own best interpretations of the constitution, not on their 
political estimation of what the central state might be willing to tolerate.  If they attempt to 
exceed their constitutionally authorized powers, they will be called to account not by whatever 
political opposition rivals are able opportunistically to marshal within the central government, 
but by courts impartially enforcing the law.   
 Second, the Spanish system of requiring central approval reinforces subnational corporate 
identity in ways that are not necessarily beneficial.  One of the strengths of federal systems, and 
a source of their capacity for endurance, is the way in which they complicate the identity of 
subnational units.  A provincial government in a federal system is for some purposes the 
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democratically legitimate voice of a distinct self-governing polity, yet for other purposes is 
nothing more than a geographically organized constituency of the national polity.99  When a 
subnational government petitions the central state for benefits in its capacity as only one of many 
national constituencies, the decision is much more likely to be framed and understood on both 
sides as resting on the ordinary distributional and administrative considerations upon which 
national governments routinely rely.  When, on the other hand, a subnational government 
approaches the central state as a sovereign seeking permission to rule its own people, the 
possibility is increased that any decision will be understood as reflecting considerations of 
corporate bilateral relations that are unique to the subnational unit making the request.  By 
forcing Autonomous Communities to petition and negotiate for the very powers that will make 
them self-governing polities, the Spanish constitutional system tends to force the transaction into 
the second, more highly charged mold.  This reinforces subnational corporate identity as 
something distinct from national identity, thereby promoting precisely the sense of regional 
identity and nationalism that the Spanish Constitution was intended to manage. 
 In no case is this tendency more starkly evident than in the extremely tense and 
confrontational series of events surrounding the recent Basque petition to Parliament for 
approval of amendments to its Statute of Autonomy (the Ibarretxe Plan).   The present Basque 
Statute of Autonomy was approved by Parliament in 1979.  The Statute contains some unusual 
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features, worked out as part of the 1978 Spanish constitutional settlement, that are based in 
historical rights of the Basque Country predating the Franco regime.100    
 In early 2005, the Basque Country forwarded to Madrid a set of dramatically revised 
amendments to its Statute of Autonomy.101  These amendments staked out a position on 
subnational autonomy far more extreme than any previously proposed by an Autonomous 
Community.  The Preamble, in language that could not have been understood as anything but 
provocative, referred to the Basque as “a People with its own identity within the community of 
European peoples,” and claimed for that people “the right to decide their own future . . . in 
accordance with the right to self-determination of all peoples.”102  The working provisions of the 
proposed Statute described the Basque right of self-determination as the right to “form a Basque 
Community, freely associated with the Spanish State”;103 recognized a right of residents of the 
Basque Community to “Basque citizenship”;104 and extended Basque citizenship and political 
rights to members of the “Basque diaspora,” wherever located.105  
 The proposed amendments also authorized the conclusion of agreements and joint 
ventures with the neighboring Autonomous Community of Navarre, in direct contravention of 
Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution, which, the relevant provision claimed, “shall not, 
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therefore, be applicable” to such agreements;106 and declared the right of the Basque Community 
to “direct representation in the organisations of the European Union.”107  The document also 
authorized the Basque citizenry to decide by referendum whether to “make complete or 
substantial changes in the format and regime of political relations with the Spanish State, as well 
as their relations with Europe and the international community,” and purported to direct the 
Spanish state to respect such decisions;108 and purported to replace the authority of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court to decide questions of the constitutionality of the exercise of national and 
subnational power with a bilateral commission in which any differences would be worked out 
politically.109  In short, the amendments proposed a framework for a unilateral Basque decision 
to leave the Spanish state, and did so in a way that did not express a great deal of respect for the 
existing Spanish Constitution.110 
 This proposal was met with immediate and intense hostility by the Spanish government, 
the political parties, the media, and even, ominously, the military.  Under the Spanish 
Constitution, proposed amendments to Statutes of Autonomy are to be taken up initially by a 
parliamentary committee for the purpose of negotiating an agreement between the Autonomy 
and the central state.111  Such a negotiation in this case was refused outright, and the 
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government indicated that it had no intention of taking legislative action of any kind on the 
Basque proposal.  The Basque President then responded by proposing that a referendum be put 
to the Basque electorate on questions indirectly relevant to the larger issue of Basque 
self-determination.112   The Spanish government then filed suit in the Spanish Constitutional 
Court to block such a referendum.  In a 2008 ruling, the Constitutional Court declared the 
referendum beyond the scope of subnational competence under the Spanish Constitution.113  The 
Basque Country has since threatened repeatedly to challenge this decision in the European Court 
of Human Rights, although at this writing has not yet done so. 
 Based on our private interviews of Basque officials, including Lekhendakari (Basque 
President) Juan José Ibarretxe Markuartu,114 we believe that an important factor contributing to 
this unfortunate escalation of conflict was a miscalculation on the part of Basque leaders that is 
traceable in large part to the constitutional structure for amending Statutes of Autonomy.  
Consistent with the structure and sequence of constitutional formalities, Basque officials 
understood the process for amending their Statute of Autonomy as one of sovereign-to-sovereign 
political negotiations.  Accordingly, they conceived of the initial draft of proposed amendments 
as an opening position in what they expected would be a multi-round process of negotiations.  
Like many parties entering what they understand to be a potentially complex negotiation, the 
Basques took an opening position that was considerably more extreme than the position at which 
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they expected to arrive by the conclusion of the negotiations.  In the event, this turned out to be 
a miscalculation because the Basque opening position was perceived by the Spanish state as 
being so far beyond the bounds of potential agreement as to make any discussion a waste of time. 
 However, both parties understood correctly that, in the context of the amendment 
proceedings, the negotiation would not be between the Spanish state and one of its constituency 
groups, but between the Spanish state and the Basque Autonomous Community in its corporate 
or quasi-sovereign capacity.  Consequently, the Spanish rejection of the Basque position was 
understood by all concerned as a rejection of a certain claim to self-governance by a unique 
polity seeking recognition of its autonomy.  Such a rejection is not legal but fundamentally 
political, and strikes not at the distributional aspirations of a national constituency but at the 
aspirations for sovereignty of a self-constituting political community.  This isn’t just business; 
it’s personal.  And this background context, in turn, helps explain why neither party thus far has 
found the will to turn back from the path of continuing escalation of the level of confrontation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Sustainable federalism may well be the form of territorial organization most conducive to 
the long-term safety and prosperity of the modern state.  We have argued here that constitutional 
design matters to the sustainability of decentralized power, but in ways that are different from 
those conventionally advanced.  It is typically thought that the critical feature in the 
constitutionalization of a sustainable federalism is a symmetrical distribution of power between 
the national and subnational levels.  But this is not necessarily the case because subnational 
units are frequently able to develop extraconstitutional methods for influencing national power 
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that can alter the balance contemplated by formal constitutional structures and allocations of 
power.  This has been true in both the United States and Spain. 
 A more important factor in the sustainability of decentralization, we believe, is symmetry 
among subnational units in their relation to the central state.  In the United States, a highly 
stable federal state, symmetrical relations between the states and the central government have 
facilitated the successful checking of national power by the states acting collectively and more or 
less in unison.  In Spain, by contrast, asymmetrical relations between Autonomous Communities 
and the central state permit the indulgence of potentially destructive rivalries at the subnational 
level that the state may in turn be able to exploit.  This asymmetry may prevent the 
subnationalities from mounting successful efforts to check national power, thereby endangering 
the stability of the state and the long-term prosperity and liberty of its citizens.  The most 
important problem of political design now facing Spain is therefore how to bring the subnational 
units into a common relation to the central state.   
